This paper analyzes the relations among bank mergers, changes in boards and their networks, and changes in the global footprint of merging banks. We examine all mergers involving U.S. banks with foreign branches between 1986 and 2004. We find that while the largest banks have become even larger through mergers, their boards have stayed roughly the same size with the same pattern of connections, leaving banks relatively less central in the intercorporate network. And while global banks previously had more globally-oriented boards, this is no longer the case, as the link between board networks and strategy has become more tenuous. Because global banks were particularly prone to merging, the average commercial bank in the U.S. is now far more domestically-oriented than firms in most other industries. American banks have thus become more domestic at the same time that the rest of American industry has grown much more global.
including geographic expansion and industrial diversification. Some, such as NationsBank (now known as Bank of America) and Bank One, went on acquisition binges, growing from regional to super-regional to near-national, with a focus on operating retail branches in ever-broader territories. Others, such as Mellon Bank and Bankers Trust (the latter now owned by Deutsche Bank), diversified into businesses such as investment banking and mutual funds. And still others, such as Citibank and the Bank of Boston, expanded their reach into global markets, by buying or expanding branch networks outside the U.S. Sometimes these strategies collided, as the largest banks were folded into an elite group of mega-banks. NationsBank, for examplepreviously a primarily domestic institution based in North Carolina-ended up with a vast network of overseas branches due to its acquisitions of BankAmerica and FleetBoston.
Prior work suggests that networks are both a cause and a consequence of bank strategies.
As banks retreated from the corporate lending business during the 1980s and 1990s, they also shrank their boards and curbed their traditional practice of recruiting "celebrity directors" (Davis & Mizruchi, 1999) . Having a well-connected board was a consequence of pursuing a strategy of lending to business. As commercial banks adopted a more financial service-oriented approach, their boards came to look more like those of investment banks. Once in place, however, a board can have a considerable influence on strategy. Well-connected banks, for example, were quicker to globalize in the 1960s than their more peripheral peers, suggesting that so-called celebrity directors brought actionable intelligence to bear on bank decision making (Mizruchi & Davis, 2004) .
In this paper, we link networks and strategy in the context of the ongoing bank merger wave. 1 We are particularly interested in understanding how the global footprint of American banks has changed as the number of participants has declined. Several of the most venerable names in global banking have disappeared or shifted identities, leaving only three significant players in the global market: Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, and Bank of America. We address four questions: First, do the boards of global banks look different from those of domestic banks?
Second, how do boards of global banks change after an acquisition? Third, how has the position of global banks in intercorporate networks changed as a result of industry consolidation? And fourth, how does the composition of the board influence a bank's approach to globalization following mergers? In addressing these questions, this paper contributes to understanding the organizational dynamics underlying financial globalization and the link between networks and strategy, especially with regard to firm-level and industry-level endogenous drivers of network change. Consistent with Amburgey et al. (2008) and Hite (2008) , we show the changing nature of network ties and structures over time. Our findings also provide an informative contrast with those of Conyon and Muldoon (2008) , who show that financial institutions continued to play a critical role in the intercorporate network in the UK as late as 2000.
U.S. BANKS AND GLOBALIZATION
Until very recently, financial institutions in the United States were fragmented both geographically and industrially. Geographically, commercial banks (that is, banks that gather deposits from savers and lend funds to businesses and other borrowers) were organized on a state-by-state level and regulated both by the Federal Reserve Bank (a national entity) and statelevel officials. Despite having names like "Bank of America," from 1832 until the early 1980s,
Chicago NBD, are announced as a "merger of equals," we believe that these statements are face-saving tactics used to placate the employees, customers, and shareholders of the acquired entity. By examining characteristics of the surviving firm such as its CEO, board, and headquarters, one can almost always determine the role of each party in an arrangement that was announced as a merger. banks (with rare exceptions) did not operate branches in more than one state within the U.S., and many states limited local banks to only a single branch (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007) .
Geographic regulation was eased in the 1980s, and in 1994 the Riegle-Neal Act lifted restrictions on interstate banking, prompting a substantial industry consolidation that created "superregional" banks.
Until recently, commercial banking (accepting deposits and making loans) had been strictly separated from investment banking (underwriting securities, buying and selling stocks Bank for brokerage and bond underwritings beginning in the 1980s and early 1990s, while conversely some investment banks were allowed to do commercial lending beginning in 1994.
Glass-Steagall was finally repealed in 1999 in the wake of the merger between Citicorp and
Travelers (an insurance company that also owned Salomon Smith Barney, a large investment bank). Citigroup, as the new firm was named, subsequently spun off its insurance business.
American banks followed a distinctive path to globalization compared to banks in Europe and elsewhere. London grew to become a major international financial center during the Victorian Era, and by the turn of the twentieth century it was home to outposts of dozens of foreign banking houses, including Schroder, Rothschild, Kleinwort, and JP Morgan. Indeed, finance continues to serve an outsize role in the British economy as other sectors of industry have faded (cf Conyon & Muldoon, 2008 First, a tight money supply made it attractive to gather "Eurodollar" deposits via London branches. 2 Second, some banks followed their large clients overseas to capture the clients' nondomestic business. Third, by the mid-1970s, leading banks were making roughly half their profits overseas, and Chase Manhattan was earning more than three-quarters of its profits outside the U.S. (Hallow, 1993) . This encouraged other banks to follow the example set by Citibank and Chase, and by 1980, 150 of them had overseas branches, spanning dozens of countries. The foreign assets of U.S. banks increased one-hundredfold between 1960 and 1980, and even the smallest banks often had foreign branches. To take one example, Colonial Bank of Waterbury, Connecticut (1980 population: 103,266 ) operated branches in the Cayman Islands (1974 Islands ( -1985 and in London (1981 London ( -1983 , despite being only the 152nd largest bank in the United States in
1980.
The industry suffered a dramatic reversal of fortune in 1982 following the Mexican debt crisis. American banks had come to be among the predominant lenders to low-income countries, replacing states as the largest source of funds. By 1982, these banks had extended billions of dollars of loans to states whose capacities to repay them were questionable. In late 1982, Mexico suspended its debt payment, leading to a contagion of default among Latin American countries and a crisis for their creditors. The subsequent period is known as "the lost decade" in economic development circles, as capital flows to low-income countries abruptly halted, ultimately to be replaced with market-based financing (Larosiere, 2005) . By the end of the decade, the banks that had been the most aggressive globalizers were those hardest hit. Congressman John Dingell claimed in 1991 that Citibank was "technically insolvent" and "struggling to survive."
American banks responded to these crises by retrenching, beginning an exodus from overseas branching that lasted from the early 1980s into the mid-1990s. As Figure 1 shows, the number of foreign branches of U.S. banks declined steadily from 1986 through 1994. The decline in the number of U.S. banks with at least one foreign branch was even sharper. As Table 1 , provides little clear evidence that these new opportunities were the driving force behind this brief expansion in overseas branching.
Entry into China (1987) , Russia (1995 ), South Africa (1995 , Vietnam (1995) , and Bulgaria 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
We have described two colliding forces in the 1990s: consolidation of the banking industry, and conflicting pressures around globalization. We argue here that the bank consolidation movement is an informative context in which to unpack the reciprocal role of networks and strategy in driving the process of corporate globalization. That is, mergers among banks, which may be based on divergent strategies, provide a context in which to explore how networks shape-and are shaped by-strategic moves. In this section, we describe some of the theoretical accounts given for banks' global expansion and retrenchment; the place of board networks in strategy; why branch networks are an apt place to examine the effects of consolidation; and how we approach the merger movement.
We first provide a word on why we study bank branching as our primary outcome measure. Although there are several ways in which a bank can operate in a foreign countryincluding contracting with other banks to act as agents (known as correspondent banking), opening a representative office, or creating a foreign subsidiary-branching is perhaps the most significant commitment to a market. Branches can do "banking proper," that is, taking in deposits and making loans, and they are legally part of the parent bank. Thus, their contributions show up on the parent company's balance sheet: deposits gathered by branches can be used elsewhere in the world, and branches can draw on the capital of the parent bank to make loans.
As such, we see branches as the most consequential presence of a bank, and a suitable measure of overseas expansion by banks.
Why did American banks globalize their branch networks as they did? Prior research gives a number of possible accounts for U.S. banks' initial forays into foreign markets, and how they ended up where they did (see Mizruchi & Davis, 2004) . The first account is that banks followed their customers. Just as vendors in the Japanese auto industry mirrored the locational choices of their major customers (Martin, Swaminathan, & Mitchell, 1998) Third, some observers have suggested that banks followed their competitors into particular markets. Banking folklore holds that Walter Wriston of Citibank was almost singlehandedly responsible for the globalization of American banking, and as we noted earlier, the vanguard banks found overseas banking highly profitable during the 1970s. Mizruchi and Davis (2004) found that as highly central banks moved overseas, other central banks were those most likely to follow. Given that the most well-connected banks were likely to see one another as competitors as well as peers, the finding suggested that banks might have been following their most direct competitors in establishing overseas branches (Henisz & Delios, 2001 ).
Although several accounts exist for banks' decisions to open foreign branches, the reasons for banks' decisions to "de-globalize" have received little attention. In fact, we are unaware of any theory of "strategic retrenchment" associated with the decline in overseas branching. One way to consider the issue of de-globalization is to assume that it is simply the converse of globalization: as a bank's customers reduce their foreign operations, for example, one might expect the bank to follow suit. The problem with this account is that for most American businesses, globalization followed a monotonically non-decreasing pattern: the average foreign sales of U.S. companies-outside of those in a few service industries (such as retail) or intrinsically local industries (such as utilities)-has risen virtually every year since the 1980s. There is little sign that companies outside of banking have been abandoning their foreign operations en masse.
An alternative possibility is that banks may have simply been out-competed outside their domestic markets. One of the unintended consequences of American bank globalization is that the American banks trained a generation of their own competitors. While the World Bank notes the benefits to foreign markets of hosting U.S. banks, in part due to the fact that American bankers can train those in the host nations, the other side of this story is that the local bankers trained by American banks can create effective local competitors to their former employers.
This suggests that the longer a branch operates, the more likely it will be to generate its own competition.
There is one phenomenon, however, that has been shown to influence banks' decisions to open foreign branches, and that we believe might also have played a role in their decisions to retrench: the banks' network ties, as indicated by their connections to other firms through their boards of directors. Corporate boards and the networks they create play a role, we argue, in both reflecting and shaping bank strategy. Board interlocks have been shown to affect strategies among a wide range of non-financial corporations, from acquisitions (Haunschild, 1993) to takeover defense policies (Davis, 1991) to philanthropy and political activity (see Mizruchi, 1996 for a review of the literature on interlocks). These effects may be even more pronounced among banks. Mintz and Schwartz (1985) noted, for example, that banks recruit executives and other directors from well-connected corporate boards specifically to guide their broad investment choices. Bank boards are much larger and better-connected than other boards, Mintz and Schwartz argued, because they provide high-level intelligence on broad trends in industry, what Useem (1984) called "business scan." Thus, although directors might not be in the trenches giving advice on particular loans or on the adoption of specific strategies, they can provide insight into long-term trends affecting business through their service on other boards. In the realm of globalization, this might take the form of advice about specific countries or regions (as in, for example, "Newly wealthy businesspeople in Malaysia like American brands, and might be a good market for asset-gathering"). Banks with more globally-oriented directors may thus be more prone to expanding or maintaining global operations themselves. Similarly, banks seeking to globalize may be more likely to recruit directors from global businesses.
In the same way that interlocks might have affected banks' decisions to open foreign branches, they might also have affected the banks' decisions to close those branches. Just as a bank's CEO might hear of overseas opportunities from a director at a board meeting, he or she might also be exposed to information suggesting that a country is an unsuitable place to conduct business. Although we believe that such events occurred and may explain some of the retrenchment that American banks experienced, there is another process that we believe may have been more important: the extensive merger activity among banks over the past two decades. This merger activity, we suggest, provides a context in which the networks within which banks were situated affected their behavior.
Mergers are a particularly appropriate context for examining the link between networks and strategy. As we have seen, strategies may lead to the creation of networks, through the recruiting of directors. At the same time, networks may also lead to the development of strategies, given that a firm's directors can shape the firm's strategic direction. Mergers are a punctuating event in this process, a stock-taking for strategy. First, when large banks merge, the resulting entity-including its board-is typically a hybrid. The board of JP Morgan Chase, which resulted from the mergers of Manufacturers Hanover, Chemical, Chase Manhattan, and JP Morgan, included directors from each of its predecessors. Who stays and who goes after the merger is a reflection of the new entity's priorities, and is thus indicative of the strategy of the new firm. Second, mergers bring to the forefront the question of which facilities will stay and which will be jettisoned. For banks, this includes decisions about the establishment, maintenance, or closure of particular branches, including those overseas. We anticipate that changes in firm strategies resulting from a merger will be observable within approximately two years.
Our research strategy, then, is to examine the boards and global branch networks of merging banks before and after the merger to explore how consolidation affects globalization (or the reduction thereof). Specifically, we are interested in the ways in which board networks and branch networks mutually influence one another. Corporate data. Corporate data, including information on bank financial characteristics and geographic segment data for non-financial firms, came from the Compustat database, accessed via WRDS. Specifically, the geographic segment data were used to calculate the amount of international experience that each outside director of a particular bank had at his or her own company. We operationalize a global board member as one whose company has international sales comprising at least 10 percent of its total sales.
DATA
Merger data. Merger data were gleaned from the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council's National Information Center, and archival searches of press releases and articles in the popular press. We recorded the names of the acquired and acquiring bank of each merger, information on the surviving bank, and the date of the merger.
These data also appear in Appendix A.
FINDINGS
How are the Boards of Global Banks Different? Table 2 presents a comparison of the size and two centrality measures-degree (the number of interlocks) and eigenvector centrality-of global banks versus non-global banks and non-financial corporations. The data in Table 2 indicate that global bank boards were strikingly different from other boards in 1987. First, the boards of global banks were much larger: the median-sized board of a bank with at least one foreign branch had 18 members in 1987, compared to 12 for non-global (or "domestic") banks and 8 for non-financial firms. Second, the boards of global banks were far more central than those of non-global banks or non-financial firms. The median eigenvector centrality of global banks was 4.59, compared to 0.14 for both non-financial firms and domestic banks, indicating that the directors that global banks recruited served on more central boards than those recruited by domestic banks. In data not shown in Table 2 , global banks had an average of 5 "received ties" (that is, executives of outside firms) compared to 2.3 received ties for non-isolate domestic banks. The median degree centrality (the average number of total ties) was also far higher among global banks (21.5) than it was for nonfinancial firms (2) and domestic banks (1).
< Table 2 about here > Perhaps most importantly from our perspective, we find that the outside directors serving on bank boards came from more globally-oriented companies: the average foreign sales of global bank directors' home companies (also not shown in the table) was 11.9 percent in 1987, compared to 8.4 percent for domestic banks. Cumulatively-given that global banks had substantially more received ties-the outside directors of global banks had significantly greater "global experience."
How do Bank Boards Change in the Context of Mergers?
When one bank acquires another, there are a number of theoretically plausible strategies that the surviving bank could follow when selecting its board members. One possibility is to keep all board members from both banks. This "keep them all" strategy, especially if applied over repeated acquisitions, would yield an extremely large, ultra-central board. The opposite approach would be for the acquiring bank to demonstrate its control over the post-acquisition bank by keeping only directors from its own board. In between these two extremes, the acquiring bank could add to its own board a few select directors from the acquired bank's board, possibly to smooth over tensions related to the acquisition but also because those directors may be highly respected or provide the acquiring bank with insight into the affairs of the acquired
bank. Yet another option would be for a more equitable split between the banks, with approximately half of the surviving board coming from the board of each bank in the merger.
This approach gives the best appearance of a "merger of equals" and also allows the acquiring bank to reinvigorate its board with new relationships and new ideas.
We find that among mergers of global banks, the "equitable split" and "acquiring control" strategies are dominant. Of the mergers listed in Appendix A, the vast majority adopted one of these two approaches. (Two mergers-RepublicBank acquiring Interfirst and Bank of America acquiring Security Pacific-can be characterized as "keep them all", though the massive boards that resulted did not last long. Each surviving bank's board was reduced by at least 50% over the next two years.) This is consistent with the findings in Table 2 that the board size across global banks slightly decreased over our period of study. By 2002, in contrast, there was not a single instance of such second-degree ties, and the overall network had become far more sparse. Global banks still had more "international" received ties than their domestic counterparts (18.4 percent foreign sales vs. 11 percent), but there were fewer of them (3.3 ties on average compared to 1.7 for domestic banks), and they did not provide conduits to other global banks.
The global reach of banks after acquisition
To what extent do global banks retain their foreign branches after they are acquired by another bank? The data in Table 3 of the 26 acquired networks saw at least one branch closed within two years.
< Table 3 about here > Table 4 presents data similar to those in Table 3 , except that the focus is on the number of countries in which the acquired banks operated, as opposed to the number of branches. Similar to the findings in Table 3 , the data here demonstrate that in the vast majority of cases, the acquired bank did not exit countries in which it had previously had branches, even two years after its acquisition by another bank. On the other hand, the foreign branch networks for 18 of the 26 acquired banks saw at least one country exited within two years. The findings in these two tables indicate that most acquired banks experienced some reduction in their foreign branching, but in most cases foreign branches remained, even after the bank was acquired.
< Table 4 about here > Table 5 presents data on the effect of acquisition on the global presence on bank boards.
Each row of the table represents a bank acquisition. The first column (after the acquisition date)
represents the pre-acquisition name of the acquired bank, followed by the number of the acquired bank's board members who were executives of non-financial corporations with more than ten percent of sales outside the U.S. one year prior to its acquisition. The next column gives the name of the bank that made the acquisition, followed by its number of pre-acquisition "global board members" (also one year prior to making the acquisition). The final column gives the name of the surviving bank subsequent to the acquisition, followed by the surviving bank's number of global board members one year subsequent to the acquisition.
< Table 5 
DISCUSSION
In this paper we have examined the relationship between interlocking directorate networks and strategy as it pertains to the foreign branching strategies of U.S. banks. We theorized a link between the amount of international experience of a bank's board members and the size of the foreign branch network operated by the bank. We anticipated that the widespread merger movement and subsequent industry consolidation that has taken place within American banking since 1986 would be a cause of the reconfiguration of foreign branches operated by U.S.
banks, and that it would do so in part through board of director networks. What we found instead was a growing disconnect between the characteristics of a bank's board and its global strategy. We have documented several manifestations of this transformation. although their centrality did not increase over time (Mizruchi, 1982) . Since then, despite the rapid concentration of the U.S. banking industry, the trend in network centrality has, if anything, been the opposite of what Lenin predicted. Not only has the centrality of global banks not increased, but it has actually declined slightly (from an average of 4.86 in eigenvector centrality in 1987 and 1992 to 3.83 in 1997 and 2002) , although this decline is not statistically significant.
Third, the regional banks that bought global banks did not retrench their newly-acquired foreign networks. In several prominent instances, they kept them intact. In addition to the earlier example of Fleet Bank, NationsBank operated just five global branches upon acquiring Bank of America, but had 53 foreign branches in 1998, after the acquisition. Although
NationsBank did close 14 of those branches over the next two years, this appears to have been done as a means of streamlining its operations, rather than as an attempt to abandon its foreign presence. As evidence of this, we note that despite its closure of individual branches, the bank withdrew completely from only one country during this retrenchment. One possible reason that these regional banks maintained the foreign presence of the banks they acquired may have been the changes in federal banking laws that were occurring during this period. The Riegle-Neal Act, passed in 1994, allowed full interstate banking (that is, banks could own branches in different states) for the first time. The lifting of this restriction opened numerous strategic possibilities to banks, and many responded by turning their attention from the local economy to economies of the region, the United States as a whole, and eventually the rest of the world.
Finally, despite the fact that the regional banks that acquired global banks maintained the latter's foreign branches, the overall level of foreign branching has fallen to pre-1982 levels. 
CONCLUSION
At its essence, this paper is an attempt to answer a question about a curious phenomenon in U.S. banking: Why, given the increased global activity of American non-financial corporations since 1980, did U.S. banks pull back from their involvement in foreign branching?
One possible reason for this, we suggested, was the concentration of the banking industry and the concomitant acquisition of global banks by smaller banks with historically regional orientations.
Our findings suggest, however, that with a few notable exceptions, the regional banks that acquired the global giants maintained the latter's foreign branches. This means that the deglobalization of U.S. banking has to be a result of factors other than the increased concentration of the industry.
One possibility that we mentioned earlier is that American banks in foreign nations were killed by their own success. In establishing a presence overseas, U.S. banks typically hired and trained bankers from the host country. These bankers, using the skills they had learned at the U.S. bank, in many cases chose to form banks of their own. The competitive advantage that they possessed as indigenous members of their societies may have made it more difficult for the American banks to compete in those markets.
We do not know how prevalent this phenomenon was, or whether it had the effect that we are suggesting. We believe that there are ways to test this argument, however. If we are correct, we might expect to observe a correlation between the prevalence of startup banks and the closure of U.S. branches, net of other factors. We could also examine the extent to which the new banks in these nations are headed by former employees of American banks located in their nations. Our assumption going into this study was that a bank's board would help shape its acquisition strategy and also its globalization strategy. In particular, the more international experience its directors have, the more extensive a bank's foreign branch network, and the less international experience its directors have, the less likely a bank's acquisition targets would have extensive foreign branch networks. In the latter's case, any foreign branches that were part of an acquisition would fit neither the bank's (and the board's) experience nor its identity and would be quickly jettisoned. The findings here suggest that we need to rethink these assumptions. It to the point where we could say that banks have had particular network assembly rules.
The literature on banks and their interlocks suggests that banks have used three network assembly rules that in turn have led to three distinct network signatures found in the U.S.
directorate network. In the earliest period of public corporations, the U.S. directorate network was balkanized and centralized as finance capitalism dominated. Major bankers such as J.P.
Morgan controlled groups of companies by placing themselves or their officers on the boards of dozens of firms (Brandeis, 1914) . As finance capitalism gave way to managerial capitalism in the 1920s, the directorate network became diffuse and centralized. Banks remained the most central actors in the intercorporate network (Mizruchi, 1982) but their network assembly rules shifted. Rather than controlling financial flows through the use of sent ties, banks sought access to information that would be available via the received ties of well-connected CEOs. These
CEOs were more than willing to serve on bank boards not only because bank directorships were prestigious but because their firms relied on banks for financing and the CEOs wanted to participate in decisions about capital flows (Mintz & Schwartz, 1985) . Beginning in the 1980s, however, technological and regulatory changes led firms to turn to other sources for financing and allowed commercial banks to enter other lines of business. This weakened the mutual dependence between banks and firms, and once again banks changed how they assembled their board networks. In this new era of shareholder capitalism, banks began to look like every other firm oriented toward increasing shareholder value. The directorate network became diffuse and decentralized as banks reduced the size of their boards and their recruiting of centrally located directors. For the first time since the rise of publicly-traded companies in the U.S., banks were no longer the center of the directorate network (Davis & Mizruchi, 1999) . This notion of network assembly rules suggests a re-orientation for how we think about network structure, network dynamics, and the role of strategy as these may be more intertwined than typical models of interfirm networks suggest. For instance, although networks are often modeled as exogenous entities whose properties influence the decisions of individual actors, in reality network properties are often endogenous with respect to the actors, who strategically construct their ties depending on their own characteristics and their partners' characteristics, including, importantly, to whom their partners are already connected.
We also need to pay attention to constraints on networking. Especially in social networks that require face-to-face communication such as boards of directors, there are social, organizational, and even physical constraints on how large a network should be. As Doreian (2008) suggests, there are liabilities to an actor of having too many ties. This point can be illustrated by the case of First RepublicBank, which thought that 46 directors would make a fine board until it discovered that the directors could not all fit in the board room (Apcar, 1988) .
Constraints may also involve filling specific roles, as we saw banks do when filling their postacquisition boards. Even though banks already had begun to appoint fewer centrally located directors, acquisitions were an easy opportunity to bring aboard these "celebrity CEOs." For the most part, though, banks chose not to. A thorough understanding of the properties and consequences of the macro network structure thus results from considering both the decisions by and properties of individual-level actors and the interactions between individual actors and the environment (Schelling, 1978) . Acknowledging these complexities and maintaining focus on both individual and network levels simultaneously would be a step in this direction. 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 Year Total Number of Countries 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 Table 5 . Number of received ties from firms with at least ten percent international sales for acquired and acquiring banks (1 year before the acquistion) and the surviving bank (1 year after the acquistion)
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